開催日：2020年6月26日

会場：オンライン開催(Google Meet 使用)

来る6/26(金)、The fourth mini-seminar of the Colloquium for the Philosophy of Time を行うことになりました。新型コロナウイルス感染症の拡大を考慮して、Google Meetを用いたオンライン開催となる予定です。どなたでも参加できますので、ご関心がおありの方はぜひお気軽にご参加ください。本セミナーはオンライン開催となります(Google Meetを使用します。ブラウザからご参加いただけますが参加にはGoogleアカウントが必要となります)。

登録：ミーティングURLを送信させていただくため、こちら(https://forms.gle/P7RaTLs7FkkR5vQaA)から登録をお願いします。6月25日(木)までにご登録いただけるとありがたいです。

プログラム（予定）：
10:00-10:10 開会挨拶
10:10-11:10 小松鈴花（京都大学）”The Diachronic Unity of Minimal Experiential Self”
11:10-11:20 休憩
11:20-12:20 山名諒（京都大学）”Reconstructing McTaggart’s Paradox: Toward A New Understanding of The Passage of Time”

要旨：

小松鈴花（京都大学）”The Diachronic Unity of Minimal Experiential Self”

This talk investigates the diachronicity of the self. My inquiry focuses on the diachronic nature of a minimal experiential self, that is a self as a phenomenological dimension of experience. When thinking about a question regarding a self over time, there are different kinds of questions: the persistence, continuity, and numerically identical self over time. Among them, the gap problem, posed by a proponent of the experiential self (Dainton, 2008), is intriguing for minimal experiential self theorists. I believe that the minimal experiential self theory, especially Zahavi’s theory, can account for the diachronic unity of the self even though they face the gap problem. To examine whether a minimal experiential self has a sort of diachronicity, I will firstly identify questions about the diachronic unity of a self and analyse how the minimal experiential self theorists should treat the gap problem. I then focus on the debate between Dainton and Zahavi to consider whether Zahavi evade the gap problem.

山名諒（京都大学）”Reconstructing McTaggart’s Paradox: Toward A New Understanding of The Passage of Time”

In this presentation I will argue that the account of passage of time offered by A theorists fails. Traditionally, the notion of passage has been defined as a kind of change like “change of A properties (pastness, presentness and futureness)” and “change of truth value.” It is true that this definition is fairly close to our ordinary conception of it. According to my thesis that I will propose, however, the passage cannot be explained as a special case of change. This is because, as I will argue, change of A properties or truth value includes four principles– Absoluteness, Relativity, Uniqueness, and Commonality which cannot be coherently combined together. Taking the impossibility of combining all of these four principles together into consideration, we are able to reconstruct the traditional argument against the passage of time, McTaggart’s Paradox, as well as the debate about it between A theorists and B theorists. By using the four principles just mentioned above, I will show that arguments of neither A theorists nor B theorists succeed since both sides beg the question. The reason for this is that they wrongly regard the passage as a kind of change. My argument itself neither argues for nor against the reality of passage, but rather shows the necessity of finding a new way of thinking about the passage of time.

＊本セミナーは科研基盤B「現代時間論の新展開：現在主義と『時間の空間化』の是非をめぐって」(http://www.lit.osaka-cu.ac.jp/user/time/index.html)（課題番号：19H01187）の活動の一部として実施されます。

＊＊ご質問等がございましたら（wataru.sasaki.001@gmail.com）までご連絡ください。

 

 

タグ：分析形而上学, 時間論