開催日：2019年1月21日、1月22日

会場：立命館大学衣笠キャンパス、京都大学吉田キャンパス

慶應大学からIstván Zárdai氏をお招きして、1月21日(月)に立命館大学衣笠キャンパスにおいて、1月22日(火)に京都大学吉田キャンパスにおいて、講演会が開催されますので、ぜひご参加ください。

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主催：立命館大学間文化現象学研究センター

共催：立命館大学人文科学研究所

日時：1月21日(月)16:30-18:00

場所：立命館大学衣笠キャンパス 末川記念会館 第3会議室（http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/accessmap/kinugasa/）

スピーカー：Dr. István Zárdai (Keio University)

タイトル：Intentional, Unintentional, Voluntary, Involuntary

アブストラクト：A large number of philosophers working on actions, mind and ethics have accepted since Donald Davidson’s ‘Agency’ that all actions are intentional under at least one of their descriptions. All such actions are rational in the sense that the agent performs them for a reason. They make sense to the agent and we can understand why the agent does them. I argue against this claim, and explore views, inspired by Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s positions, which deny that all action is intentional under at least one of its descriptions. Engaging with the work of Rosalind Hursthouse, Richard Teichman, John Hyman, and Hong Yu Wong, I argue that there are both intentional and unintentional actions, as well as non-intentional actions. Furthermore, actions can be unintentional and also voluntary or involuntary. And there is also a category of non-voluntary, arational actions. Many automatic movements belong into this last category. Hence, what counts as action is much broader than what we do for a reason, and as such, what is rational.

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日時：1月22日(火)16:30-18:00

場所：京都大学文学部校舎地下小会議室 (No.8 of this map)

スピーカー：Dr. István Zárdai (Keio University)

タイトル：Is There an Essential Difference Between Actions and Events?

アブストラクト：Some philosophers – notably, John Macmurray and E. J. Lowe – have defended the claim that there is an essential difference between actions and events. The former are agents’ bringing about results and should not be conflated with the latter, which are merely events. In my talk I survey their arguments for this stance and identify its source. My diagnosis is that they are committed to think of persons as special sources of change. I argue that it is plausible to hold that persons have special capacities and abilities and these distinguish some of their actions from other events, nevertheless agents’ doings are still occurrences. These capacities and abilities can be made sense of as powers or dispositions, and their activation as an occurrence. This means that not only human agents can act, and their acts are not essentially different from other occurrences in the world. Hence, other agents – animals and sufficiently complex AIs for example – might be acting in similar ways.