

Is Intuition Important for Philosophy?

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企画趣旨：

It is widely believed that intuition plays an important role in the practice of philosophy. Recent studies of experimental philosophy, especially studies in its negative program, claim to show that intuition is not reliable because it varies among groups, is sensitive to irrelevant factors, and so on. If that is the case, we may have to change the way we do philosophy radically. It is far from obvious, however, that intuition is both important and unreliable in philosophy. There may be technical flaws in the experimental studies. The results may not necessarily show that intuition is unreliable. Intuition may not play an important role in philosophical arguments. To see how threatening the results of experimental studies really are, we have to take a closer look at these issues.

In this workshop, we have two speakers. One speaker, Max Deutsch, is skeptical about the role of intuition in philosophy. In his recent book *The Myth of the Intuitive*, he argues that in the typical philosophical arguments where intuition is said to play a crucial role, we actually rely on argument, not on intuition. He claims that the attack on analytic philosophy from experimental philosophers is therefore off the mark. The other speaker, Jennifer Nado, is more sympathetic with the standard view. In some of her recent papers, she argues that intuition plays some epistemic role in at least some of philosophical arguments. Starting from these two talks, followed by a short commentary by Masashi Kasaki, we will examine such issues as the nature of intuition, the role of intuition in philosophy, and the implication of recent experimental studies for the practice of analytic philosophy.

*使用言語は英語です。