

# Propositional Attitudes and Measurement Theory

鈴木 聡 (Satoru SUZUKI)  
駒澤大学総合教育研究部非常勤講師

Davidson [1, pp.3–4] points out the difficulty with which standard accounts of propositional attitudes are faced as follows:

Many of the objects [of propositional attitudes] I have mentioned [= proposition or their constituents] have a special relation to the mind; ... The propositional objects of the mind, and their constituents, are supposed, then, to have these two properties: they *identify*, or help identify, a thought by giving its content; and they *constitute* an essential aspect of the psychology of the thought by being grasped or otherwise known by the person with the thought. The problem is to understand this psychological relation. Here is the main difficulty. ... But if a thought is constituted the thought it is by the mind's knowledge of the identifying object, then someone knows what thought she is thinking only if she knows which object is in her mind. Yet there seems to be no clear meaning to the idea of knowing which object one has in mind.

To avoid this difficulty, Davidson [1, p.11] resorts to the following *measurement-theoretic* analogy between measuring weight and attributing states of belief:

Just as in measuring weight we need a collection of entities which have a structure in which we can reflect the relations between weighty objects, so in attributing states of belief (and other propositional attitudes) we need a collection of entities related in ways that will allow us to keep track of the relevant properties of the various psychological states. ... Similarly in thinking and talking about the beliefs of people we needn't suppose there are such entities as beliefs. Nor do we have to invent objects to serve as the "objects of belief" or what is before the mind, or in the brain. ... For the entities we mention to help specify a state of mind do not have to play

any *psychological* or epistemological role at all, just as numbers play no physical role.

Then Davidson [1, p.14] argues that the *utterances* which are produced in attributing propositional attitudes are the objects of them as follows:

But utterances have certain *prima facie* advantages, since they are non-abstract, and so come with a speaker, a time, and a context attached. So I will assume we have settled on utterances, the very utterances that are produced in attributing attitudes, as the objects that serve to individuate and identify the various states of mind.

He [1, p.16] states that the utterances have the following desired feature:

Just as numbers can capture all the empirically significant relations among weights or temperatures in infinitely many different ways, so one person's utterance can capture all the significant features of another person's thoughts and speech in different ways.

Rawling [4], Matthews [3], and Dresner [2] discuss Davidson's measurement-theoretic account of propositional attitudes. *Representation* and *uniqueness theorems* are two main theorems in measurement theory. Matthews [3] attempts to develop Davidson's measurement-theoretic account of propositional attitudes so that both a representation theorem and a uniqueness theorem can hold. However, his sketch of a proof of the representation theorem has the difficulty that the proof is *circular*. The *aim* of this talk is to propose a new version of logic—First-Order Logic of Belief (FLB)—the model of the language of which can reflect Davidson's arguments above on a measurement-theoretic account of propositional attitudes and can avoid the difficulty that Matthews' sketch of a proof of the representation theorem is circular. (使用言語：日本語)

## 参考文献

- [1] D. Davidson. What is present to the mind. *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 36:3–18, 1989.
- [2] E. Dresner. Decision theory, propositional measurement, and unified interpretation. *Mind*, 123:707–732, 2014.
- [3] R. J. Matthews. *The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and their Attribution*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.
- [4] P. Rawling. Davidson's measurement theoretic reduction of the mind. In Kotatko. P. et al., editors, *Interpreting Davidson*, number 129 in CSLI Lecture Notes, pages 237–255. CSLI Publications, Stanford, 2001.