

‘Only’ の単純な伴立分析

鈴木 聡 (Satoru SUZUKI)

駒澤大学総合教育研究部非常勤講師

A considerable number of studies have been made on the *particle* ‘only’. (1) Only John can speak French. The underline is used to indicate a *focused term*. (1) is considered to relate to the following propositions:

- the *exclusive* proposition that nobody other than John can speak French, and
- the *prejacent* proposition that John can speak French.

Ippolito (2007) discusses the following four analyses that take the *same* position (*assertion*) on the exclusive proposition but take *different* positions on the prejacent proposition:

- *Entailment Analysis* (Atlas 1993),
- *Strong Presupposition Analysis* (Horn 1969),
- *Weak Presupposition Analysis* (Geurts and van der Sandt 2004), and
- *Implicature Analysis* (McCawley 1981).

According to Ippolito, in the *entailment analysis*, (1) *asserts* both the exclusive and the prejacent propositions. This analysis can account for the *meaninglessness* of the following sentences: (2a) ‡ Only John can speak French, and/but Bill can too. (2b) ‡ Only John can speak French, and/but John cannot. For the second part of (2a) contradicts with the exclusive proposition, and the second part of (2b) contradicts with the prejacent proposition. According to Ippolito, this symmetry breaks down in *negative* sentences: (3a) Not only John can speak French. Therefore, somebody other than John can speak French. (3b) Not only John can speak French. Therefore, John can speak French. For in (3a) the exclusive proposition is negated, whereas in (3b) the prejacent proposition is not negated (*Problem 1*). According to Ippolito, in the *strong presupposition analysis*, (1) *asserts* the exclusive proposition, and *presupposes* the prejacent proposition. Because presuppositions project under negation, the asymmetry in (3) is explained. According

to Ippolito, contrary to the standard behavior of presuppositions like in (4b), the prejacent proposition does not project in *modalized* ‘only’ sentences: for example, in (4a) the speaker is not committed to the truth of the prejacent proposition (*Problem 2*): (4a) It is possible that only John can speak French, and maybe not even he can. (4b) ‡ It is possible that John regrets having smoked, and/but maybe he never smoked. According to Ippolito, in the *weak presupposition analysis*, (1) *asserts* the exclusive proposition, whereas ‘only’ is a presupposition trigger but the presupposition that it triggers is an *existential* proposition. (1) presupposes that *someone* can speak French. The prejacent proposition follows from the exclusive proposition together with the existential proposition. According to Ippolito, an ‘only’ sentence with a conjoint NP in focus, such as (5), only presupposes that someone can speak French: (5) Only John and Mary can speak French. Because what is asserted is that nobody other than John and Mary can speak French, the prejacent proposition does not follow (*Problem 3*). According to Ippolito, in the *implicature analysis*, (1) *asserts* the exclusive proposition, whereas the prejacent proposition is a *conversational implicature*. This analysis cannot explain why the truth of the prejacent proposition is conveyed by a *negative* ‘only’ sentence (*Problem 4*). Ippolito (2007) proposes a new analysis of ‘only’ that can deal with all of Problems 1-4 above. However, even in Ippolito’s analysis of ‘only’, there remain at least two problems that Ippolito herself points out in explaining the difference between (6a) and (6b) (*Problem 5*) and that between (7a) and (7b) (*Problem 6*): (6a) Only Mary can speak French, and maybe not even she can. (6b) ‡ Only John married Sue, and maybe not even he did. (7a) ‡ I don’t know whether Mary can speak French, but definitely only she can. (7b) I don’t know whether Mary ate all of the cookies, but she definitely ate some. The *aims* of this talk are to provide a *first-order epistemic logic of ‘only’* (FELO) that is a variant of *entailment analysis* and that is by far *simpler* than Ippolito’s analysis in Ippolito (2007) and, to show that FELO is sufficient to deal with not only all of Problems 1-4 in the existing analyses before Ippolito (2007) but also Problems 5 and 6 in Ippolito (2007) only in terms of *semantics (truth conditions)* without resorting to complicated *pragmatics* to which Ippolito’s analysis does. (使用言語：日本語)