

文脈主義にとっての真理と意味

Truth and Meaning for Contextualism

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In this paper I shall argue that Wittgensteinian contextualist cases (*a la* Travis and others) and Gettier cases in epistemology are two sides of the same coin, or the consequences of the existence of what I call *contextually loaded proposition*. One and the same sentence can express two (or indefinitely many) different contextually loaded propositions, depending on the context, and while in contextualist cases such propositions have different truth conditions (with different truth values), in Gettier cases they share the same truth condition. I will argue for the existence of such contextually loaded propositions through careful considerations of Gettier cases. There are two important consequences of it: One is that, despite recent criticism (Whiting 2011), contextualism is indeed inconsistent with deflationism about truth, as Travis has long insisted. Another consequence is that, since this kind of proposition is independent of truth condition, Travis's formulation of the contextualism in terms of truth condition (e.g. in his 1997) is misguided, and the project like *truth-conditional pragmatics*, by the fellow contextualist Recanati (Recanati 2010), is also doomed. I will sketch how the contents of belief and sentence are to be naturally individuated, which in turn explains why the concept of knowledge seems primitive. (This paper is a natural extension of the papers presented last two years in this conference, which together constitute a prolegomena of what I called elsewhere the *knowledge-first semantics*.)

1. Background: Contextualism is a thesis that it is “intrinsically part of what expressions of [natural language] mean” (Travis 1997, p.87) that a given sentence can express indefinitely many different propositions depending on the context (even without any indexical element). This may be taken as one of the consequences of Wittgenstein's thesis of meaning as use. Charles Travis has argued for contextualism, with numerous interesting examples, in his papers and books (e.g. Travis 1996, 1997, 1989, 2006).

2. Arguments for Contextually Loaded Propositions: Contextualists have characterized the contextually determined propositions in terms of truth conditions,

as if propositions are individuated by truth condition. Against this, I will argue that different truth conditions entail different propositions, but not *vice versa*, and the context itself is involved in such propositions in an important sense (in particular, *how it came to being*, its history, is involved as part of *what it is*, its content.), through the following three observations of *Gettier cases*:

1) In standard Gettier cases the belief in question has content intuitively different from that of possible genuine knowledge in the same situation, while they just happened to share the same truth condition.

2) The description of lucky cases with indexicals demonstrates the case of different contents sharing the same truth condition, though they are standardly taken as the cases of different “characters” with the same content, and contextualism is the generalization of such context-dependency to non-indexical cases.

3) The existence of *mathematical Gettier cases* implies that the content of relevant belief in such cases is different from that of corresponding mathematical sentence. For, the former is accidentally true, while the latter is necessarily true.

3. Natural Individuation of Content and Truth Condition: Against 1), however, one may respond that the same cannot be said to the fake barn case and its variants. Against 2), one may still wonder how we can individuate the content independently of its truth condition. Against 3), one may respond by distinguishing the *epistemic* property of truth from *semantic* property of truth, taking the accidentality of the truth in Gettier cases as an epistemic property. To worries about 1) and 2), I will answer by appealing to the natural pattern of belief retraction, which *naturally* individuates the content of belief (and derivatively, that of other truth-bearers), and doing so dissolves the distinction of the metaphysical necessity and the epistemic necessity implicitly assumed in the response to 3).

4. Deflationism: The existence of such contextually loaded propositions falsify deflationism by posing a dilemma: When the right-hand side sentence is *used* (rather than *mentioned*) to express the contextually loaded proposition, contextualist cases would trivially falsify the “only-if”-direction of the disquotational version of T-Schema (DS) unless the context is fixed constant throughout the two sides of the bi-conditional. If, on the other hand, the context is fixed throughout the bi-conditional, which is by definition the case in the propositional schema (PS), T-Schema (whether DS or PS) effectively eliminates any *accidental truth* whatsoever. Indeed, it eliminates all the Gettier cases by rendering all the relevant beliefs in them *false*. Thus either way, T-Schema should be judged false, at least for the folk concept of truth.