1. Background: One's view on reference seems to have direct implications for debates in various fields of philosophy (Machery et al. 2007). However, some people (Chomsky 1993, 1995, Stich 1996, etc.) have expressed skepticism about the theory of reference in general. Indeed, even the question of what the theory of reference is supposed to do does not have a straightforward answer (Stich 2009). A related question is the role of folk intuitions. Let us suppose that the job of the theory of reference is to describe the tacit theory of the relation behind such intuitions, or “folk semantics” (cf. Stich 2009) of referential terms. Such a position already invites skepticism about the linguistic normativity, and if, as many philosophers assume, meaning is essentially normative, then this skepticism extends to meaning. Thus, denying the reality of shared linguistic norms, Davidson (1990) and Chomsky (1995) claimed that there is no such thing as language or languages. Here we are actually sympathetic with skepticism of Stich and Chomsky about the theory of reference. There should be no unique “correct” or “true” theory of reference. But that is not because we are skeptical about the linguistic normativity.

2. Cultural Variance of Reference?: The seminal work that claims to show the cultural variance of linguistic intuitions about reference is Machery et al (2004). There have been however a number of (and mostly right) criticisms already thrown against it (Ludwig, 2007, Lam 2009, Deutsch 2009, Ichikawa et al., forthcoming). The most relevant here is the lack of clear distinction between the speaker reference and semantic reference. The theory of reference should be concerned with the latter, not the former, but we rather claim that the very possibility of the gap here in fact constitutes the normativity itself: For those who lack such a distinction there is no relevant linguistic normativity. Then exactly where the possibility of this gap or the normativity of reference consists in?

3. Psychologizing Fregean Sinn: Let us first carefully distinguish Frege’s Sinn as 1) a “mode of presentation” (the Evans-McDowell object-dependent de re sense (McDowell 1984)) and 2) a “way of determining” a Bedeutung. 1) may be further re-interpreted as an “aspect” of the object in Wittgenstein's sense. But the more general sense of Sinn is 2). If, however, we take it literally, as a “procedure or means one can carry out for determining the Bedeutung”, then when extended to the Gedanke, it entails verificationism (Klement 2002, p. 60).

4. Sinn as Practical Knowledge: Instead, we propose here to take a Sinn in ths
sense as a part of the content of *practical knowledge* in the sense of Anscombe (1957), that knowing what one is doing. Thus the sense (Sinn) of a word is what one has (understand) when and only when one knows what one means by the word. In other words: **For any expression e, and any person S, what e means for S is what S believes e to mean when and only when S knows what e means.** Note here that, (1) “what e means for S” does not necessarily imply that this is about the speaker meaning, as long as it can be distinguished from what S *intends* to mean by e, and (2) this formulation is supposed to apply to linguistic expressions quite generally, like proper names, natural kind terms, and any other nouns, or even verbs.

5. **Normativity and Knowledge:** Just as Anscombe’s practical knowledge, where we may be *mistaken* about what we are doing, we may also be mistaken about what we mean by e. This possibility is what constitutes the linguistic normativity, which is also a gap between thinking that one is following a rule and in fact following the rule. In the case of practical knowledge, we should distinguish it from knowledge of the content of intention: one may fail to know what one is doing, while one still knows what one *intended* to do.

6. **Reference and Belief Change:** According to what I called the sustainability analysis of knowledge in my (2011), knowledge is belief that is sustainable against actual information. For example, suppose that, S believes that S is following rule R. If this belief is sustainable, i.e., whatever actual information in the world does *not* make S retract the belief, then S *knows* that S is following rule R. If not, upon some information, S’s belief *naturally* changes and the belief in question will be given up. Then let us look at how the account of reference looks like according to this analysis, by Kripke’s Gödel/Schmitt case used in Machery et al. (2004). Suppose, in that vignette, the person who newly learned about Gödel and the incompleteness theorem before, says “Gödel is a genius”. Then she finds that actually Schmitt had proved the theorem and Gödel stole it. Which would be her reaction? The natural change of her belief is either to 1) retract her belief that Gödel is a genius *(the causal-historical account)*, while knowing who “Gödel” refers, or 2) retract her belief that the name of the person who proved the incompleteness thesis is Gödel and therefore did not know who his “Gödel” was referring to *(the description theories).* The possibility like 2 constitutes the normativity of reference *(the gap with intention).* The choice between 1 and 2 is, however, not a matter of which is true, or what the *correct* theory of reference dictates. It just depends on the context, the background belief of the speaker, and even the culture, or simply *everything* that is relevant to the possible belief change concerning these beliefs. This also means that the normativity of reference itself may vary depending on the context, culture, etc. In other words, there is no such thing as the “correct” theory of reference that determines which of 1 and 2 is right. The present account instead explicates the (meta-semantic) *fact* of a linguistic expression meaning something.