

真理条件から知識条件へ

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Take Williamson's famous knowledge account of assertion literally, then we obtain the following instances of the schema:

- 1) Assert "If P, then Q" only if you know that *if P, then Q*.
- 2) Assert "P but Q" only if you know that *P but Q*.

But what kind of knowledge is it, which appears in these sentences? Is there such knowledge at all? In this paper I will argue that there is indeed such knowledge, and even try to explain the *content* of the assertion in terms of the content of such knowledge, which I call knowledge-condition.

Here knowledge is understood as belief that is monotonic against information in the environment, in the sense of surviving the reception of any information in the actual world at a particular time, or what I called the *sustainable belief* (Mizumoto 2011). Given this understanding, we may explain the content of the assertion in the following way:

(KC) By her assertion "P" A means *what A believes when and only when A knows that P*, relative to A's actual informational state.¹

In contrast with simple "P means that P", which is about the meaning of *sentence* independent of the speaker, KC explicitly refers to the speaker, explaining her meaning by the content of (possible) knowledge. Here the content of belief is individuated by the possible belief change of the speaker, which will allow us to have the content of knowledge that is finer-grained than the standard truth-condition.

Thus in the case of 1), the semantic content of A's assertion "If P, then Q" is explained by A's knowledge that *if P, then Q*, which is then explained by A's sustainable belief that *if P, then Q*.² This means that, there is no information in the environment

¹ The obvious assumption here is that the content of knowledge is more basic than that of belief, even if knowledge is analyzed by belief. As Williamson says, belief may be "botched knowledge". Indeed, I hold that knowledge be more primitive than *truth*.
² We assume here, unlike popular probabilistic analyses of indicatives, that the belief of such indicative conditionals is a *full belief*, since we believe that Modus Ponens is essential to any conditional, while we cannot eliminate the counterexample to MP as long as we assume such a probabilistic approach (Mizumoto 2009). Our belief about the world is the sea of full beliefs, with only islands of partial beliefs depending on our practical interests.

such that A would abandon or suspend the belief in question, like information such that *P but not-Q*. Moreover, even if P is not realized, there should be some reason for assuming the connection between P and Q, which may be undermined by some information. The knowledge condition then commit the speaker to there being no such information around, and if there is, the world is not like what is asserted, even if the *sentence* may still be true, which marks the difference between truth condition and knowledge condition (cf. material conditional analysis of the indicatives by Grice and Jackson based on conversational / conventional implicature).

In the case of 2), the knowledge that *P but Q* is likewise explained in terms of the sustainable belief that P but Q. This kind of belief can be in fact abandoned or suspended if there is information about the relation between P and Q such that P in fact depends on Q, or *vice versa*. Among such information is that *if P, then Q*. Given such information, even if you still believe both P and Q, you would not believe that *P but Q*, any more (cf. cancelability test of implicature). This does not mean, again, that “P but Q” is *false* in that situation.

In contrast with the standard explanation in terms of implicature, in which such implicature of an assertion is understood as something *over and above* the truth condition of the sentence uttered (the same as that of “Not-P or Q” in the case of 1) and “P and Q” in the case of 2)), our explanation gives the semantic content as a single unified content. Since in communication what a person means by an utterance is what she intends the hearer to know, the speaker herself *knows* what she means by that utterance. Then the semantic content of A’s assertion, and therefore its knowledge condition, can be understood as the set of *centered* worlds in which A knows the content (which corresponds to the *primary truth condition* of Chalmers, but I do not take it to be a truth condition). I do not however take this as the truth condition, since *it is essential to the explanation of what a person means to eliminate the possibility of accidental truth*. The gap between the content of a sentence and what is asserted by that sentence arises from the very possibility of accidental truth. In general, as long as the content of assertion (or any utterance), or that of belief (intention, desire, fear, etc.), of a person is explained by truth condition, it can be satisfied in any strange way quite unexpected by that person (cf. the problem of logical omniscience). But stipulating the existence of “implicature” here, which is itself explained by the truth condition, would just carry over the original gap. In contrast, the content of knowledge almost *by definition* eliminates this possibility.

We are not suggesting that the content of knowledge cannot be represented (if only derivatively) by truth condition, let alone that truth condition should be abandoned. But we certainly propose to replace the Davidsonian assumption of the alleged essential connection between *truth* and meaning by that of *knowledge* and meaning. We then consider how much this approach can be generalized, and evaluate it in comparison with cognitive semantics. (なお発表は日本語で行います)