

On Singular Causal Statements

(Changed from the original title: Belief in Causation)

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In this session, I would like to deal with the problem of *singular causal statements*. In my opinion, this problem seems not to have been treated in public. Of course, there was an argument so far that opposed or challenged *Hume's regularity theory*, which had insisted the indispensability of *generalization* for causal statements since a long time ago; and such an argument led to much the same conclusion as singular causal statements.

I will also choose a way similar to this argument. However before that, I think, we should clarify what is *general* and what is *singular*, in the world; and in order to answer this question, I would like to refer to *Davidson's theory of events*, and formularize singular causal statements in terms of *first-order logic* as follows:

- (1) ε_1 caused ε_2 .
- (2) The cause of ε_2 was ε_1 .
- (3) ε_2 was caused by ε_1 .

Here, " ε_1 " and " ε_2 " are *singular terms* in the sense of contemporary *philosophy of language*. Again, " $_$ caused $_$," "The cause of $_$ was $_$," and " $_$ was caused by $_$," are *two-place predicates* in first-order logic.

Yet, I do not intend to construct any formal or logical systems. By taking up these formulas, I merely want attendants to consider the problem of singular causal statements within these schemata.

Now, formularizing singular causal statements with this form, in order to treat their problem, I refer to Hart&Honoré, the jurists who wrote the famous and influential book *Causation in the Law*. As far as I know, they are the first person to treat the problem in the above-mentioned sense. Thus, in this session, I will mainly refer to their argument.

However, since there is not enough time to read my whole paper, I will only read the first half of my paper, to be concrete, up to page 6. My manuscript is written in English, but I attach a Japanese translation to each word that I think difficult or too specialized.